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The extremely dramatic social transformation – called ‘the great transformation’ by Polanyi (1985) – that the full emergence of capitalism and industrialism meant in Europe led to the birth of modern social theory. The attention of the classics of the 
studies was taken up by trying to describe, understand, and explain this social change: 
What is actually going on? What does it mean to people and society? What does the 
development depend on? And what can be done about all social problems that this new 
society creates? Changes in working life are at the center of the analyses of social science 
from the start. Even when the analyses concern religion, culture, music, and the family, the 
emergence of a labor market, capitalist wage labor, and the concentration of production in 
large industries provide the reference point. Working life is the central arena of the classics 
of social theory. There is, however, no common definition of the key concept ‘work’ or 
‘labor’ among the classical social scientists – as little as among current ones. Why is that?
We discuss the differences between Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, although we 
concentrate on the development of Marx’s conceptualization of work, as he is the one 
among them to elaborate the analysis the most. We regard the differences in the light 
of the entity that their respective theory specifies (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 16). We define a 
social theory as interrelated statements that tell us that a certain entity (thing, object, or 
process) exists in the world and often what this entity can do, that is which mechanisms 
it possesses (Karlsson & Bergman, 2017, Ch. 1). Social theories are, then, arguments 
or series of interrelated arguments about something existing in the social world and 
commonly what social mechanisms are parts of the entity. The latter characteristic is 
especially important as mechanisms are what social scientists refer to in explanations. 
Theories are explanatory, although sometimes in the form of hypotheses, and what 
social science ultimately aims at is explaining the social world. Our analytical point of 
departure is that the defined entity of a theory also functions as a mechanism influenc-
ing its other concepts. We illustrate this claim by analyzing Marx’s, Durkheim’s, and 
Weber’s differing ways of conceptualizing ‘work’ as an aspect of their respective theories 
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pointing out quite dissimilar entities: Marx’s basic entity is ‘capital’, which requires deep 
analyses of processes in working life, hence, his comprehensive theorization and concep-
tualizations of work and labor. Durkheim’s entity is social cohesion, threats to it and 
how it can be organized; it is the importance of the division of labor, not labor itself 
that interests him. The social entity that fascinates Weber is the rationalization process, 
which does not require him to conceptualize work in itself as exhaustively, although he 
analyses working life intensely. We start with Marx.
Marx’s Concepts of Work
The concept of work and labor is one of the most important ones in Marx’s oeuvre. He 
used it in one way or another during his whole life, from his interest in the generic being 
of humans in his youth to his analysis of the economic laws of motion of the bourgeois 
society in Capital. It is, however, not exactly the same concept he uses, because he puts 
it in different contexts, and therefore, it refers to different social objects. In this part, 
we discuss how the same term – work or labor – acquired different meanings for Marx 
dependent on the level of abstraction and in which theoretical argumentation it is used.
Work as a basic determination of human beings
In Marx’s youth, when he discussed Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, he writes that it is ‘The 
outstanding achievement of Hegel’s Phänomenologie that Hegel grasps the essence of labor 
and comprehends objective man […] as the outcome of man’s own labor’ (Marx, 1844, 
p. 66). In other words, Marx agrees with Hegel’s anthropological definition of human 
beings as a result of their labor. This is even more obvious when Marx uses this determina-
tion of humans in a comparison with other animals. Man is, Marx writes, ‘an active natural 
being’, and like other animals, they ‘have corporeal needs, are suffering, conditioned and 
limited creatures’ (Marx, 1844, p. 69). However, there is one important difference between 
humans and other animals, namely that the humans produce their means of subsistence 
through their own work. In The German Ideology, Marx writes:
Man can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you 
like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin 
to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organ-
isation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual 
material life. (Marx, 1987, p. 18)
In sum, this concept of work tells us that the human productive labor is what distin-
guishes human beings from other animals. Through their capacity to work, humans 
not only produce themselves individually, but through it they also produce their own 
history. So, because of their abstract capacity to work, humans transform themselves in 
accordance with the development of their work methods and their physical, psychologi-
cal, and social needs. The ability of humans to work is therefore the basic force through 
which they change both the world around them and their own nature. This abstract 
notion of the labor of human beings is Marx’s first concept of work.
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Work as alienated labor
However, this abstract concept presupposes a social reality where humans freely develop 
their capacity to produce both their subsistence and themselves. Another concept of 
work on a more concrete level is what Marx elaborates with the notion of alienated 
labor. In this analysis, Marx combines the abstract determination of work as a capabil-
ity to express human nature through the labor process with the existing social forms of 
the production of their subsistence. Even if the overwhelming majority of the working 
people at the time Marx wrote this – in the 1840s in Western Europe – were peasants 
or craftsmen, he understood that a new way of producing was approaching rapidly. The 
basis for this new form of production was the relation between the private property 
owner of the means of production on the one hand and the ‘free’ laborers who were 
forced to sell their capacity to work to the owner of the means of production on the 
other hand. Hence, this is the basis for what Marx calls alienated labor.
According to Marx, the human capacity of creative production will in these cir-
cumstances be transformed into alienated labor, because this kind of labor is ‘external 
to the worker, that is, it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, there-
fore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself’ (Marx, 1844, p. 30). Instead of 
being a part of the worker’s self-creation it is, Marx says, forced labor. Therefore, this 
kind of work is 
not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien 
character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, 
labour is shunned like the plague. As a result, the worker only feels free in his animal func-
tions – eating, drinking, procreating, or the most of his dwelling and in dressing up, etc.; 
and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What 
is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal. (Marx, 1844, p. 30)
This alienation is expressed in several ways. The wage laborer is alienated from the 
result of his work, which now belongs to the capitalist. He is also alienated from the 
concrete working process and from other workers through the competition between 
the workers to get a salary. But, as we saw above, the workers are also alienated from 
their generic being, that is, in their work, they are not humans any more, but reduced 
to working animals. Lastly, Marx argues that wage labor alienates the individual from 
society and that therefore ‘we must avoid postulating ‘society’ again as an abstraction 
vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being. His manifestations of life […] 
are therefore an expression and confirmation of social life.’ (Marx 1844, p. 45)
Work as the foundation of the history of societies
If it is true that the basis of the life of human beings is their creative ability to work and 
produce themselves and the subsistence they need to survive, then this creative ability to 
work must also be the basis of the historical process of humankind. In this way, the con-
cept of work is also the foundation of the history of societies. In the so-called material-
istic conception of history, the concept of work is placed in the context of concepts such 
as the economic basis of society, its legal and political superstructure, the forces and 
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relations of production, which together form special modes of production. However, it 
is obvious that Marx bases these societal concepts on the human capacity to work, for 
example, when he writes that the basic 
premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history [is] that men must be in a 
position to live in order to be able to ‘make history’. But life involves before everything 
else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical 
act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs. (Marx, 1987, pp. 17–18)
Work as labor power in the capitalist system
Also in Marx’s theory of capitalism, the concept of work has a very important place. 
However, it is much more complicated in this part of the theory than before, and there 
are some prominent distinctions that sustain the basic theoretical framework. The foun-
dation of the production in the capitalist system is the production of commodities to 
be brought to and sold on the market. After Marx has discussed the double nature of 
commodities – they have both use value and exchange value – he says that the owner of 
money who wants to start to produce
must be so lucky as to find […] in the market a commodity, whose use-value possesses the 
peculiar property of being a source of value, whose actual consumption, therefore, is itself 
an embodiment of labour, and, consequently, a creation of value. The possessor of money 
does find on the market such a special commodity in capacity for labour or labour-power. 
(Marx, 1887, p. 119)
In this theory, therefore, the capacity of human beings to work has two aspects. The first 
is concrete labor, that is, the concrete work a person does who produces something, a 
car, a dress, a bottle of wine, or something else. This work is behind the commodity’s 
use value, to drive, to dress, or to drink. The second aspect is abstract labor, which is 
the amount of time that a person has worked on some object. It is this abstract labor 
that makes different commodities exchangeable with each other. When we exchange 
commodities, or use money to pay or get paid, we therefore exchange certain amounts 
of human labor. Therefore, there is no basic difference in the capitalist system between a 
commodity that is produced in a factory and the special commodity that is a part of the 
human being: the capacity to work. Both are commodities that are produced, and both 
have use value and exchange value. The labor power’s exchange value is equivalent to 
the wage the laborers get for selling their capacity to work. Then, the laborers use this 
wage to buy subsistence to produce the next day’s labor power. The use value of labor 
power is the concrete labor a worker does while working: 
On the one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, expenditure of human labour 
power, and in its character of identical abstract human labour, it creates and forms the 
value of commodities. On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure of human labour 
power in a special form and with a definite aim, and in this, its character of concrete useful 
labour, it produces use values. (Marx, 1887, p. 33)
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 7  ❚  Number 2  ❚  June 2017 111
Marx uses this difference between the result of the labor power’s use value, that is, the 
product that the concrete labor will generate, and exchange value, that is, the abstract 
labor time the producers has used to produce the goods, to explain the capitalist’s profit. 
The difference between how much value a worker’s labor power can produce during, for 
example, a day, and his or her exchange value – that is, the wage during that day – Marx 
calls surplus value. The surplus value is based on this difference, and from this surplus 
value, the company’s profit emerges.
Behind the surplus value, there is another concept of work in the theory of capital: 
the concept of surplus labor. Marx uses this concept to show that the surplus value in 
the capitalist system is just another form of surplus labor. In slave societies and in feudal 
societies, the slaves and the peasants had to work more than to produce subsistence for 
themselves because the slave owner and the noble also lived on their labor. So,
capital has not invented surplus labour. Wherever a part of society possesses the monopoly 
of the means of production, the labourer, free or not free, must add to the working-time 
necessary for his own maintenance an extra working-time in order to produce the means 
of subsistence for the owners of the means of production. (Marx, 1887, p. 164)
This means that in all class societies, there is some form of surplus labor, but the forms 
will vary depending on the form that labor takes in that society.
In this context, Marx makes an interesting point about the development of the 
concept of abstract labor. He says that it is only in a capitalist economy that one can 
‘discover’ the abstract nature of labor, because the capitalist does not care what kind 
of work is performed, it is only the amount of labor that is behind the value of the 
produced commodity. Marx gives the credit for this discovery to Adam Smith, who, 
according to Marx, ‘rejected all restrictions with regard to the activity that produces 
wealth – for him it was labour as such, neither manufacturing, nor commercial, nor agri-
cultural labour, but all types of labour’ (Marx, 1859). Therefore, Smith was the first to 
understand that human labor is behind the value that is produced in capitalist economy. 
Marx also makes a methodological point of the relation between the historical develop-
ment and the abstraction process:
The example of labour strikingly demonstrates how even the most abstract categories, 
despite their validity in all epochs – precisely because they are abstractions – are equally a 
product of historical conditions even in the specific form of abstractions, and they retain 
their full validity only for and within the framework of these conditions. (Marx, 1859, 
section 3)
An obvious example of Marx contextualizing his concept of work is when he discusses 
the difference between productive and unproductive labor. Here, Marx defines the dif-
ference from the point of view of capitalist production:
Productive labour […] reproduces not only this part of the capital (or the value of its own 
labour-power), but in addition produces surplus-value for the capitalist. […] Only that 
wage-labour is productive which produces capital. (Marx, 1863, p. 1)
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It is only that work which produces value for the worker’s wage and surplus value to 
the capitalist that, from the point of view of the capitalist system, can be regarded as 
productive work. All work in society which does not produce value for capital must, 
according to this view, be considered unproductive. It is not the work in itself or how 
valuable its results are for people or society that makes work productive or unproduc-
tive. It is only work that contributes to increasing capital that is productive in capitalist 
society, according to this theory.
Conclusion
One conclusion from this overview of Marx’s concepts of work is that he changed his 
conceptualization depending on in which context of working life it was discussed. How-
ever, there seems to be continuity between the young Marx’s discussion of work as a 
free and creative activity that differentiates human beings from other animals, over the 
concept of alienated labor and the idea that human labor is the basis of the historical 
process, to the mature Marx’s discussion of the labor power of the wage laborer. The 
difference between these various concepts of work is that they are situated at different 
levels of abstraction. The first concept, work as a free, creative activity, is an abstract 
anthropological determination of human beings. In the materialistic conception of his-
tory, Marx makes this general determination the foundation of the historical process, 
which means that ‘men make their own history’ as creative agents, but not as they please, 
‘not under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given 
and transmitted from the past’. (Marx, 1852, p. 5)
In the discussion of alienated labor, Marx analyses what will happen with the 
anthropological determination of human beings in a society where work is performed 
by wage laborers. In his theory about the ‘laws of motion’ of the capitalist system, he 
uses several conceptions of work, from the transformation of work to wage labor, over 
the valorization of the concrete labor to abstract labor and the relations between surplus 
labor and surplus value, to the concepts of productive and unproductive labor from the 
perspective of the expansion of capital. Therefore, one can say that the concept of work 
is both very important in many of Marx’s texts, and that there are dissimilar but closely 
related concepts in his theory of work. It is also important to note that Marx’s basic 
goal with his own theoretical and practical work was to contribute to what he called 
‘the emancipation of work’ (e.g., in Marx, 1974, p. 82), because in a society where one 
part of its inhabitants is subordinated to another part, work can never be a ‘free, cre-
ative activity’. It was Marx’s vision about the post-capitalist society that in it the human 
capacity to work would at last be liberated from compulsion. This life-long theorizing 
of work is an effect of the mechanism of the concept of capital being the entity driving 
his theoretical development.
Durkheim’s Lack of a Concept of  Work
In the theory presented in Émile Durkheim’s (1964 [1893]) The Division of Labor 
in Society the entity is not labor but social cohesion. In view of the phrase ‘division 
of labor’, Durkheim was mainly interested in the concept of division – that tasks are 
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divided – rather than the concept of labor – what is divided. In spite of the title of the 
book, he does not discuss working life until the last part. We seek in vain for a definition 
or even a more detailed discussion of the central concept of labor or work (Durkheim 
1930 [1893] uses only one term, travail, but it is translated with both English terms). 
Durkheim sees the division of labor as a general biological process, starting with the 
introduction of life itself on Earth. The social division of labor is merely a special case 
of this process, which ‘governs the entire world’ (1964: 41). The reason he analyses the 
division of labor is that in society it has the moral function of creating social solidarity. 
He mentions several different forms of work, such as domestic, economic, scientific, and 
artistic work, but without any internal relation between them. We do not learn what 
makes them types of work. At the same time, the division of labor plays an essential role 
in Durkheim’s theory.
The important distinctions are made between types of solidarity in types of societies 
and in order to understand the position of the division of labor in Durkheim’s theory 
we need to look at them. The most important distinction is that between two types of 
solidarity: mechanical and organic. As law expresses morality, Durkheim applies types 
of law as measures of the different forms of solidarity. Where penal law expressed in 
repressive sanctions, which inflicts harm in one way or another on those offending it, 
is widespread there is mechanical solidarity. Contract law with its restitutive sanctions, 
which tries to bring things back to what they were before the offence, is instead exten-
sive where there is organic solidarity. Further, mechanical solidarity is based on likeness 
between its members, while organic solidarity comes from differences between them. 
Each corresponds to a certain form of society, namely the mechanical solidarity of seg-
mental societies and the organic solidarity of advanced societies. We are thereby getting 
closer to the division of labor. In mechanical solidarity, individuals are subjected to the 
same values and norms in a ‘collective conscience’. Members of groups are incorporated 
in them in such a strong way that one cannot claim that there are individuals; every 
offence against the norms of the collective conscience is punished severely. Individuals 
are fitted into the group in a mechanical way, that is naturally and without reflection. 
The more advanced society has, however, a quite different character in this basic regard. 
The development of the division of labor leads to organic solidarity, which in contrast 
to the mechanical one is based on differences between people. New and strongly spe-
cialized occupations emerge and many other social functions are differentiated from 
each other. Hereby, the individual emerges through people in their specialization being 
divided from other people – but at the same time the individuals become dependent 
on each other. Social solidarity does not build any longer on the common and strictly 
guarded moral of mechanical solidarity, but is based on the dependence of individuals 
on one another in a system of specialized functions, which has arisen with the division 
of labor of advanced societies – organic solidarity.
Even if the moral function of the division of labor is to fill the social need of solidar-
ity in civilization, this is not the reason for its development. In explaining the division 
of labor, Durkheim employs the concepts of density and volume of a population. Older 
types of societies are segmented – they are built by a number of structural segments 
without much internal connection. In the development toward advanced societies, more 
and more segments are opened up, resulting in increasing relations between people. 
From this follows growing moral density in society accompanied by material density 
in the form of means of communication. More moral and material density lead in their 
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turn to an amassed division of labor. A second cause is growing social volume, as the 
density process incorporates more and more people in society. A quite intriguing ques-
tion in connection with this explanation is raised by Dag Østerberg (1974, p. 58), who 
points out that it seems to be taken directly from a passage in Marx’s Capital without 
Durkheim mentioning this. Marx (1974, p. 245; our emphases) says in his analysis of 
the division of labor in manufacture:
Just as a certain number of simultaneously employed laborers are the material prerequi-
sites for division of labor in manufacture, so are the number and density of the popula-
tion, which here correspond to the agglomeration in one workshop, a necessary condition 
for the division of labor in society. Nevertheless, this density is more or less relative. A 
relatively thinly populated country, with well-developed means of communication, has 
a denser population than a more numerously populated country, with badly-developed 
means of communication.
In contrast to many of his contemporaries as well as predecessors, however, Durkheim 
does not regard the growing division of labor as leading to decomposition of the social 
order; instead, he claims that it gives rise to a new social order with a different kind of 
community bearing the stamp of organic solidarity.
Then, in the third part of the book, he discusses abnormal or pathological forms of 
division of labor in contemporary France. These are forms that exist but do not result 
in social solidarity. They can all be found in working life, as does Durkheim’s suggested 
solution. It is not until here that work really enters the picture. One of the abnormal 
forms is the anomic division of labor, of which a first type is economic crises; a second is 
the conflict between capital and labor – which Durkheim regards as a deviation or social 
sickness, but which Marx sees as the central inherent trait of capitalism; and a third is 
the increasing specialization of scientific work. Behind this pathology lie rules that have 
developed outside the division of labor and which have made it difficult to understand 
and foresee. Organic solidarity can only come about when the rules emerge from within 
the division of labor itself.
Another abnormal form is the forced division of labor, which occurs when there are 
class struggles, resulting in individuals’ positions in the social division of labor not being 
in accordance with their natural abilities. ‘In short’, Durkheim says (1964, p. 377), ‘labor 
is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a way that social inequali-
ties exactly express natural inequalities.’ When people are forced into positions that are 
unnatural for them, the division of labor cannot result in organic solidarity. Finally, there 
is an abnormal form that Durkheim does not name, but which we can call ‘discontinu-
ous work’ (cf. 1964, p. 392) and which means that employees do not have enough to 
do at their workplaces. This leads to too few contacts, something that diminishes the 
possibilities for organic solidarity.
Durkheim also puts forward a suggestion – mainly in the famous ‘Preface to the 
second edition’ – to solve the problems created by the abnormal division of labor. He 
explains its background like this (1964, p. 5):
if anomy is an evil, it is above all because society suffers from it, being unable to live without 
cohesion and regularity. A moral or juridical regulation essentially expresses, then, social 
needs that society alone can feel; it rests in a state of opinion and opinion is a collective  
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thing, produced by collective elaboration. For anomy to end, there must then exist, or be 
formed, a group which can constitute the system of rules actually needed.
This group would be made up of corporations of both workers and capitalists. Corpo-
rations would have the necessary intimate knowledge of working life – and life outside 
work – and at the same time the authority to uphold the natural rules produced inside 
the division of labor. Thereby, the organic solidarity, which now is prevented by abnor-
mal division of labor, would grow.
Compared to the analysis in The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim (1992) 
discusses labor a little bit more explicitly, although in a critical approach, in his lectures 
on professional ethics and civil morals, first delivered in 1890. In connection with his 
analysis of the phenomenon of property and the origin of ownership, he polemicizes 
against what he calls ‘the theory of labor’. In his description, this is a somewhat sim-
plified version of the labor theory of value as expressed by the classical economists, 
claiming that property rests on work. This theory, he says (1992, p. 125), cannot at all 
explain how property ‘has become what it is and how we can account for the form it has 
in present-day societies’. In one polemical formulation, he comes as close to a definition 
of work as he gets (1992, pp. 154–175): ‘Labour in itself […] consists exclusively in a 
certain expenditure of muscular energy; it cannot, then, create things’. In accordance 
with his theory of religion, property is instead explained by the societal opinion by being 
regarded as holy.
In sum: Durkheim does not need to define the concept of work because the entity 
of his theory is social cohesion. This makes the division of tasks between people more 
important than that it is work that is divided. Further, when he analyzes working life in 
connection with the discussion of pathological forms of division of labor, he can be satis-
fied with taking the concept for granted: work is wage labor. The entity of his theorizing 
does not make a more definite conceptualization of work or labor necessary. When he 
later gets closer to a definition, it is only to criticize the ‘theory of labor’ as an explana-
tion of the existence of property in society.
Weber’s Limited Conceptualizations of Work
Max Weber, like Marx, put forward more than one concept of work. The first one 
appears in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the second and third in 
Economy and Society and they are not compatible – which is an effect of work not being 
the entity of his theoretical endeavors – a position instead taken by the historical ratio-
nalization process. To start with the first concept of work, Weber constructs an ideal 
type of the spirit of capitalism through the writings of Benjamin Franklin, who in his 
Advice to a Young Tradesman expressed this spirit ‘in almost classical purity’ as an ethos 
of this economic system (Weber, 1970, p. 48; [1904–1905]). There are several forms of 
capitalism in history, but this is the spirit of the specific modern form developed in the 
West and which is characterized by rational organization of – at least formally – free 
labor. These ideas emphasize that the individual has a duty to increase the capital that 
he or she possesses and not waste resources on a life in luxury. ‘Time is money’, Franklin 
says. People should live their lives according to these maxims; it is an ethos for how to 
spend your entire time in modern capitalism constantly, rationally, and systematically 
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seeking profit. Life in capitalist culture should be a duty, a calling to labor for the sake 
of labor itself – a calling in the sense of a well-defined domain to work in, a task defining 
one’s life. This ascetic trait is central to the spirit of capitalism of the Western world – 
and has never been seen before in any other social system.
The term ‘calling’ is of importance here, but the translator, Talcott Parsons, had 
some trouble with it. Weber’s term is Beruf and Parsons says that he sometimes trans-
lates it as ‘profession’ and sometimes as ‘calling’, depending on context (1970, p. 194, 
n. 11). It is worth noting this when reflecting on Weber’s concepts of work. (Weber him-
self made rather extensive comments on the etymology and development of the meaning 
of the word Beruf, 1970, pp. 204–211, n. 1–3). We will come back to this point in con-
nection with his second conceptualization of work.
Now, Weber’s interest does not lie in the spirit of modern capitalism in itself, but 
in its connections to religious ideas, especially Protestantism. How can the emergence 
of this spirit of ‘a calling and the devotion to labour in the calling’ (1970, p. 78) be 
explained historically? Here, Weber dismisses what he calls ‘the more naïve historical 
materialism’ (1970, p. 55, cf. p. 75) of base and superstructure – it is unclear whether he 
alludes to Marx or some of his followers. At the same time, he declares his own position 
as more sophisticated than being the opposite of naive historical materialism: 
we have no intention whatever of maintaining such a foolish and doctrinaire thesis as that 
the spirit of capitalism (…) could only have arisen as the result of certain effects of the Ref-
ormation, or even that capitalism as an economic system is a creation of the Reformation.
Instead, he uses terms such as ‘correlation’, ‘closely connected’, and an ‘intimate relation-
ship’ for the link between the spirit of capitalism and the Protestant ethic.
Aiding this comparison, he constructs another ideal type – this time, of course, of 
the Protestant ethic. This is based on the teachings of Jean Calvin but at the kernel of 
it lies a specific ideal type of work constructed on the theology of the English Puritan 
Richard Baxter. Beside Calvin, Baxter plays the same role for the pure type of the Prot-
estant ethic as Franklin does for the one of the spirit of capitalism. Baxter preached the 
importance of ‘hard continuous bodily or mental labour’, Weber (1970, p. 158) says, 
and there are two different motives that together lead to this position. One is the idea 
that work has an ascetic effect through being a shield against a sinful life; the other is 
that one should work for the glory of God. Not wanting to work in a disciplined way is 
an indication that one stands outside God’s grace. No one is freed from this command – 
it is without exception (1970, pp. 159–160; 1934, p. 172):
Even the wealthy shall not eat without working [arbeiten], for even though they do not 
need to labour to support their own needs, there is God’s commandment which they, 
like the poor, must obey. For everyone without exception God’s Providence has prepared  
a calling [Beruf], which he should profess and in which he should labour. And this calling 
is (…) God’s commandment to the individual to work for the divine glory.
In this analysis, it is obvious that the term Beruf as calling has a strong moral connota-
tion. In Economy and Society (1978 [1919–1920]), the term Beruf is, however, used 
without this moral sense – or as Weber (1970, p. 205) says, in an ‘ethically colourless’ 
way. It is also translated as ‘occupation’, not ‘profession’ or ‘calling’. This is the second 
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conceptualization concerning working life. The term, Weber (1978, p. 140) says, ‘will be 
applied to the mode of specialization, specification, and combination of the functions 
of an individual so far as it constitutes for him the basis of continuous opportunity 
for income or earnings’. He then goes on to discuss diverse variants of occupational 
structures in different times. Weber uses, then, the same term – Beruf – for two differ-
ent concepts, something which the translators have observed through expressing it with 
calling and occupation, respectively. Still, it might be a bit confusing if it goes unnoticed.
A third concept of work can also be found in Economy and Society. It is presented 
as part of Weber’s development of a specifically sociological, as opposed to economic, 
terminology for analyses of the economy. At the same time, the concept of work is only 
a minor part of this conceptual constellation. In the overwhelming multitude of con-
cepts, typologies and definitions within the economic sociology, the concept of work 
plays an insignificant role. Let us follow some of the threads involved in the concept. To 
begin with, Weber defines the sociological categories of economic action. In this series 
of conceptualizations, we have first economically oriented action, which means that 
the actor gives the act the meaning that it satisfies a desire for utilities; then economic 
action, defined as ‘any peaceful exercise of an actor’s control over resources which is 
in its main impulse oriented towards economic ends’ (1978, p. 63); further, rational 
economic action which involves deliberate planning (instrumental rationality). Another 
conceptual trait involved in the concept of work is a distinction between economy and 
technology. Technique involves the means to reach the goals of an action while economic 
action is concerned with the ends of an action. ‘Services’ are ‘Utilities derived from a 
human source, so far as this source consists in active conduct’ (1978, p. 68). There is also 
the element that there is a higher probability that managerial actions in economically 
oriented actions are rational than other actions in organizations. Finally, there are three 
types of division of labor, technical, economic, and social, and the definition of ‘labor’ is 
part of the technical, not the social, one.
Thereby, we can go to the formal definition of work: ‘Human services [Leistungen] 
for economic purposes may be distinguished as (a) ‘managerial’, or (b) oriented to the 
instructions of a managerial agency. The latter type will be called ‘labor’ [Arbeit]’ (1978, 
p. 114; 2013, p. 296). This definition turns out, however, to be a bit ambivalent as Weber 
immediately adds:
It goes without saying that the managerial activity constitutes ‘labor’ in the most definite 
sense if labor is taken to mean the expenditure of time and effort as such. The use of the 
term ‘labor’ in the sense defined above, as something distinct from managerial activity, has, 
however, come to be generally accepted for social reasons, and this usage will be followed 
in the present discussion. For more general purposes, the terms ‘services’ or ‘work’ will be 
used. (1978, p. 114)
This leads Weber to use phrases such as ‘labor or other work’ and ‘management and 
ordinary labor’ more than just ‘labor’ or ‘work’ in the further argumentation.
In sum, we find that Weber uses three different concepts of work in his analyses. In 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism work (Beruf) is a calling as part of the 
ideal type of the Protestant Puritanism as well as in that of the spirit of modern capital-
ism. It is thereby not a general concept but adjusted to the requirements of these ideal 
types, and thereby rather limited in scope. In Economy and Society, the term Beruf has a 
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quite different meaning, namely occupation, which is an even more limited sense. A third 
conceptualization can also be found in Economy and Society, in which work is as lim-
ited through being demarcated as non-managerial actions – and often traditional rather 
than rational in orientation. In the pure type of Puritanism, everyone without exception 
should work in a calling. Here, labor embraces managers as well as workers, it is ratio-
nal and it is carried over into capitalism. In the more general sociological analysis of the 
economy, on the other hand, managers do not work but their actions are rational, while 
those who work are oriented to management’s rational orders but are themselves more 
traditionalistic. There are rifts rather than continuity between Weber’s three concepts of 
work, however limited each one of them is. The reason for this is that the entity of his 
theoretical endeavors is not work or even working life as such, but the rationalization 
process running through all of history.
Conclusion
Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber all formulated their theories in relation to 
the world-shattering transformations of working life through the industrial and capitalist 
revolutions. Their common denomination is that analyses of the development of working 
life are central to them. The broad divergences between their theories within this field are 
well-known, but we pay attention to the special differences in their ways of theorizing 
the concept of work. Marx struggled continuously with several conceptions of work at 
different levels of abstraction, from work as a free and creative activity that makes up the 
dividing quality between human beings and other animals, over the alienation in wage 
labor to the decisive role of work in the secret of the commodity and of profit. Durkheim 
did not discuss the concept of work at all, despite the importance of the division of labor 
in his theory. It is the phenomenon of division, not labor, that is important in relation to 
the development from mechanical to organic solidarity. Not even in his analyses of the 
anomic division of labor and its remedies – located in working life – does he consider the 
concept of work itself. Instead, he seems to tacitly agree to the common idea in sociology 
that work equals wage labor. In his book on Professional Ethics and Civil Morals, he 
is also extremely critical of what he calls the theory of labor. Weber, finally, formulated 
three rather limited and partly contradictory concepts of work. One, termed Beruf, is 
part of the ideal type of the Protestant work ethic, expressing that everyone has to work 
in a disciplined way in a calling because such is God’s will. The second, also termed 
Beruf, is an occupation in the division of labor. And the third makes up a small part of 
the enormous set of concepts in his economic sociology, defining work as human services 
for economic purposes that are directed toward management dispositions.
We suggest that the differences we have pointed out between these three classics of 
social theory can be explained by the diverging entities that their respective theory defines. 
The entities function as mechanisms for the treatment of the concept of work. Our point 
of departure is that social theories define entities existing in the social world. For Marx 
capital, its development and expressions, is this entity which makes work a central concept 
in his theorizing. In Weber’s theorizing the rationalization process through history is the 
entity, leaving only limited room for the concept of work. And the entity of Durkheim’s 
theory is social integration and solidarity, in which the division of tasks plays the decisive 
role while what is divided – called work in a taken for granted sense – is unimportant. 
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We have tried to demonstrate that the perspective of the conceptualization of entities of 
theories as mechanisms for actualizing other concepts directs us toward noticing traits in 
theories not quite observed before: Marx’s continuity in conceptualizing work at different 
levels of abstraction; Durkheim’s lack of a real concept of work as he first is uninterested 
in what in the division of labor is divided and then tacitly accepts the formula work is 
wage labor – all due to the entity of his theory being social cohesion; and Weber’s three 
limited and contradictory work concepts, because each play different theoretical roles in 
separate analyses of the rationalization process, which is the basic entity of his theory.
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